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Abstract
The Large Hadron Collider (LHC) will incorporate a
large amount of superconducting elements that require
protection in case of a quench. Key elements in the
quench protection system are the electronic quench detec-
tors. Their reliability will have an important impact on the
down time as well as on the operational cost of the collider.
The expected rates of both false and missed quenches have
been computed for several redundant detection schemes.
The developed model takes account of the maintainability
of the system to optimise the frequency of foreseen checks,
and evaluate their influence on the performance of differ-
ent detection topologies. Seen the uncertainty of the fail-
ure rate of the components combined with the LHC tunnel
environment, the study has been completed with a sensi-
tivity analysis of the results. The chosen detection scheme
and the maintainability strategy for each detector family are
given.
1 INTRODUCTION
Although reliability is already a very important requisite
in accelerators working as subsystems of new technolo-
gies [1], existing research accelerators are not optimised
from this point of view and all former studies show a lack
of data and, above all, of methodology.
The Large Hadron Collider is a very complex supercon-
ducting machine, whose success will not be defined only by
the two classical objectives in a high energy particle accel-
erator, energy and luminosity, but also by its reliability and
availability performance. Together with these basic goals,
there are aspects like the large energy stored in the mag-
nets, the number of critical components and the long repair
times, that give to the LHC reliability analysis a much more
important role than it had for other accelerators.
Although there is experience in reliability engineering at
CERN [2], until nowadays it has not been used as a general
tool for complex accelerator design. A proper approach to
the LHC reliability must take profit of the broad techni-
cal experience of the institute together with data from other
laboratories in order to create models that will allow to pre-
dict the system reliability or, in other words, quantify the
lack of knowledge [4]. Well known methods used in other
fields like the space industry may be adopted [3].
Dependability analysis (including reliability, availabil-
ity, maintainability and safety) are required in LHC for all
systems related to personnel and equipment protection. In
∗Antonio.Vergara.Fernandez@cern.ch
this respect, the quench protection system (QPS) represents
a key element to prevent hardware damage from possible
resistive transitions of superconducting elements.
2 QUENCH DETECTORS
The LHC superconducting elements are equipped with
electronic quench detectors [5], which are able to identify
a resistive transition at any point of the superconducting
coils, bus bars or current leads, and at any state of the ac-
celerator powering cycle.
The general layout of a quench detector can be subdi-
vided in several common functional blocks: instrumenta-
tion wires from the cold-mass to the quench detector racks,
redundant quench signal generators (amplification, buffer-
ing and comparator), multichannel evaluation logic, time
discriminator and powering. In addition, there is a small
data acquisition and test system for diagnostics, power per-
mit and post mortem analysis. A quench will be detected
when a certain number k out of the n channels (k-oo-n) stay
above a threshold voltage longer than a certain time period.
The reliability of such detectors has an important im-
pact on the total LHC reliability. A non-detected quench
can easily provoke an irreversible damage on the quenched
element and an important loss of time and money for its re-
moval and substitution. On the other hand, too safe designs
could often generate false quench signals decreasing also
the total available time of the machine.
2.1 Failure Modes
The quench detectors show three different failure modes:
• False Quench (FQ): Due to the fail safe design (neg-
ative logic), this is a safe failure mainly generated by
powering trips, broken instrumentation wires or prob-
lems in the voltage references.
• Unprotected Magnet (UM): This dangerous failure
occurs when a detector becomes blind and is unable
to perform its basic function.
• Missed Quench (MQ): This is the main failure. The
superconducting element quenches when the detector
is blind.
2.2 Maintainability
In order to increase the availability of the detection sys-
tem, two different checks are foreseen:
• Coherency Test (CT): The redundant channel signals
and the quench signal are connected to a XOR gate
that will send a warning (coherency flag) to the con-
trol room when any of the signals is different from
the others. This increases the reliability against false
quenches.
• Quench Test (QT): A simulated quench signal is
sent from the control room setting all the channels at
’Quench’ level. If one or more do not change, the
coherency flag will provoke the generation of a warn-
ing message. If all the channels are blind, the output
of the quench detector will show the failure staying at
’No Quench’ state. If the check is followed by a repair
of the damaged element the availability of the system
is set to 1 (“as good as new”). Since this test implies
the discharge of the quench heater power supplies, it
can only be performed when the magnets are cold and
not powered.
The design and maintainability of the quench detec-
tors has been set according to the different properties of
the protected superconducting elements and circuits, which
can be classified in five families: main dipoles and lattice
quadrupoles, insertion and final focusing magnets, correc-
tor circuits, current leads and bus bars.
3 RELIABILITY MODEL
3.1 RESQP: REliability Software for Quench
Protection studies
Our objective is to create an analytical model for a gen-
eral protection system whose components and outputs not
only have the usual ’works’ and ‘does not work’ states, but
also intermediate ones for predicting different system fail-
ures. The model has to include the possible maintenance
policies and their effects on different topologies. In order to
choose the best solution a cost has to be given to each fail-
ure. This cost does not have to be necessarily constant and
can change depending on the state of the accelerator (e.g.
a false quench signal will have a different running cost im-
pact before injection than during collisions at top energy).
Moreover, the model has to include possible screening be-
tween component failures (e.g. a powering problem will
generate a false quench even in a blind detector due to the
negative logic) and dependencies between failures (e.g. a
quench can not be missed if the detector has not become
blind first).
The relative simplicity of the electronic boards and the
repetitive structure along all the machine makes the system
suitable to be modelled analytically. On the other hand,
the multiple failure modes of components, the risk and cost
time dependencies and the complex maintenance strategy
recommend the use of Monte Carlo methods. Nevertheless,
the high precision of the results obtained with Monte Carlo
will fade due to the high uncertainty on the reliability data
of the electronic devices. This makes the Monte Carlo code
complexity and computing time not worthwhile [6].
The analytical approach has been chosen [7]. Using the
Markov State-Space methodology, the different states of
each component are defined together with their transition
probabilities and their influence on the state of the complete
system. In order to provide a tool for this implementation
and related computations, the simulation program RESQP
(REliability Software for Quench Protection studies) has
been developed. This program manages the implementa-
tion of the structure function of the system and computes
the expected downtime for each topology with the different
maintenance strategies. After computing each failure prob-
ability, the program gives the expected downtime for the
whole machine with the confidence level set by the user.
3.2 Input Parameters of the Model
The input values to be introduced by the user can be di-
vided in two groups: those related to the LHC performance
and those related to the reliability performance of the elec-
tronic components used in the quench detectors.
The first group comprises the total lifetime of the ma-
chine, the expected operational time per year, the num-
ber of superconducting elements, etc. These parameters
are properly defined in the LHC Baseline documents. The
most difficult to estimate is the expected quench rate for the
different elements. In some cases, like for the main dipoles
and quadrupoles and the insertion magnets, the minimum
number of quenches for which the most sensitive hard-
ware elements are designed has been used. In the case of
other elements like the current leads or the corrector cir-
cuit magnets, an estimation is very difficult. Therefore,
a broad sensitivity analysis has been carried out comput-
ing the expected number of missed quenches for different
quench rates.
The reliability data on electronic components are the
principal input parameters. The two main sources are the
Military Handbook (MIL-HDBK-217F) widely used and
accepted in very different fields and the data provided by
the manufacturers. The values are usually given with a
60% confidence level at 25◦C. They have been corrected
up to a 95% level at 35◦C using the provided accelerated
test data with the Chi-Square distribution and the Arrhenius
formula.
3.3 Solution for the local quench detectors
A quench in one of the main magnets is detected by a
floating bridge detector [5], known as DQQDL, which con-
tinuously compares the voltages across the two apertures
(dipoles) or two poles (quadrupoles). Each potential level
is routed out from the superconducting element by two re-
dundant instrumentation wires. An instrumentation ampli-
fier, a voltage reference and a comparator complete the gen-
eration of the channel signal. The studied topologies are:
• Redundant Analog Part: The signal is treated by a k-
oo-n active redundancy. Since the voting circuit is not
redundant, checks will not prevent from failures at the
logic level.
• Redundant analog and logic part: It has been ob-
served that increasing the number of channels (e.g.
2oo3 or 2oo4) does not mean necessarily less unpro-
tected magnets. This is due to the higher complexity
of the logic part. This topology tries to compensate
this effect. Schemes like 2oo4d (d refers to doubled
logic) show a good reliability but the price to be paid
is a high complexity in both, the analog and the logic
part.
• Two detectors in series redundancy: The whole detec-
tor, with a simple scheme (e.g. 1oo2) is duplicated and
the cards are connected by an AND gate (wired logic).
Results show that a simple topology like two 1oo2 de-
tectors linked by an AND (1oo2and1oo2) gives a reli-
ability level almost as good as the complex 2oo4d.
• Two detectors in parallel redundancy: In order to im-
prove the unprotected magnet reliability two simple
detectors (e.g. 2oo2) are linked by an OR gate (wired
logic). Two 2oo2 detectors connected with an OR
(2oo2or2oo2) show almost as good results as 2oo4d.
The simple topology makes it the preferred option.
Failures for yearly quench tests and monthly coherency
tests are listed in Table 1 (90% confidence level). The last
column shows the mean downtime in days. The main pa-
rameters used have been [8]: 2016 magnets, 24 quenched
magnets per operational week, 20 years lifetime and maxi-
mum yearly operation of 5110 hours.
Table 1: 90% confidence interval for the number of false
quenches, unprotected magnets and missed quenches for
the DQQDL detectors in 20 years of LHC operation.
Yearly quench tests and monthly coherency tests have been
applied.
topology FQ UM MQ downtime
1oo2 408-462 3-10 0-3 132 days
2oo3 193-233 11-23 0-5 117 days
2oo4 199-240 18-32 1-7 157 days
2oo3d 198-557 2-9 0-2 73 days
2oo4d 210-252 0 0 48 days
1oo2and1oo2 187-227 6-15 0-4 99 days
2oo2or2oo2 197-238 3-11 0-2 73 days
It is important to notice that in the best case the num-
ber of false quenches is around 10 per year. Pareto stud-
ies show that they are mainly due to problems with pow-
ering. Redundant power supplies have been considered.
The effect of this will be an increase in the number of
FQ in 2oo2or2oo2, while a reduction of this number in
1oo2and1oo2. On the other hand, the latter topology has
a higher cost and a larger number of MQ. A study [9]
has been carried out concluding a pay-back period for the
investment not lower than seven years within the most
favourable conditions. This result discourages to take this
option.
For the other quench detector families similar studies
have been carried out. Due to the lower expected quench
rates (except for the insertion magnets) and fewer detectors
per family, 2oo3 and 1oo2 topologies perform well enough.
The first one has a lower missed quench reliability but, on
the other hand, the individual powering for each channel
reduces almost to zero the total number of false quenches.
Nevertheless, the space for these detectors in the accelera-
tor tunnel is more restricted than it was for the local quench
detectors. This constraint makes the 1oo2 with common
powering the preferred solution in all these families.
3.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In order to check the robustness of the model and to look
for strong interaction between inputs, the sensitivity of the
results to the reliability data of the components has been
studied. The different failure rates have been simultane-
ously drifted up to 100% of their nominal values. The same
has been done for external parameters like the quench rate.
No big changes on the results or strong dependencies have
been found.
4 CONCLUSIONS
Reliability analysis is a very powerful and useful tool
for optimising the LHC performance. Reliability, availabil-
ity and maintainability play a major role in all the quench
protection subsystems like the quench detectors. The code
RESQP has been developed for optimising the QPS hard-
ware and the maintenance strategies. The design phase of
all the quench detector families is now completed and pro-
totypes are being produced.
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